Institutionalization Guidebook
When thinking about redesign of political systems, it can be useful to think about the scope of design in terms of two dimensions: categories of decisions (e.g. health, education, economy) and decision functions (e.g. agenda setting, proposal development, decision making).
1.1. What categories of decisions should this design address?
Here are some possibilities worth considering:
Decisions about certain categories of policy (“issue areas” such as future generations, climate, education, or “cross-issue” themes such as constitutional change)
Decisions about any category of policy, whenever certain conditions occur (e.g. important, controversial, costly, difficult to make a trusted decision)
At the request of certain actors, such as:
Here are some possibilities worth considering:
Stages of policy making, such as:
Other functions outside of the policy cycle itself, such as:
For example:
Here are some criteria to consider, when deciding how to divide the decision-function space into remits.
In terms of task requirements, Terrill Bouricius has identified five types of conflict that can occur from allocating functions with conflicting requirements to a single body [Bouricius, 2013]:
There is a conflict between maximizing descriptive representativeness, versus maximizing interest and commitment among members of a deliberative body . . .
There is a conflict between increasing participation and resistance to corruption through short terms of office, versus maximizing participants’ expertise or familiarity with the issues under consideration through longer or repeat terms . . .
There is the conflict between giving every citizen the right to speak (self-selection) – offering agenda items, information and arguments for the deliberative process (isegoria), versus the danger that the self-selection of those most motivated to speak will promote domination by special interests and steer outcomes away from the common
good . . .
There is a conflict between wanting a diverse body that engages in problem solving through active deliberation, versus independent personal assessment (“private deliberation”) that taps the “wisdom of crowds” and avoids information cascades, which can shut out private knowledge . . .
There is a conflict between maximizing democratic power by allowing a deliberative body to set its own agenda, draft its own bills, and vote on them, versus avoiding the bundling of issues, with the resulting vote-swapping, as well as arbitrary decisions arising from the persuasive powers of a few unrepresentative charismatic members . . .
2.1. What body (or bodies) should be responsible for each “remit?”
Most often this will be politicians, high level civil servants, and/or the voting public (through a referendum).
2.2. Decisions about each body
3.2. For each of these, how should the process work?
3.3. Governance
5.1. What is needed to make this design sustainable?
5.2. How (and by whom, and when) should this design be evaluated and adapted?
6.1. Problems of failure
6.2. Problems of success
6.3. Opportunities
Get to know our Living Guidebooks
We created three comprehensive and situationally-relevant living guidebooks on institutionalization, the Global South, and difficult issues